In this paper we investigate robustness and dynamics for coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU games). In particular we study sequences of TU games. These sequences model dynamic situations in which the values of coalitions of players are not known beforehand, and are subject to changes over time. An allocation rule assigns a payoff to each player in each time period. This payoff is bounded by external restrictions, for example due to contractual agreements. Our main questions are: (i) under which conditions do the allocations converge to a core-element of the game, and (ii) when do the allocations converge to some specific allocation, the so-called nominal allocation? The main contribution of this paper is a design method for allocation rules that return solutions in the core or ε-core of the game under delayed information on the coalitions' values, and therefore the resulting allocation rule is called robust.
Introduction
In this paper, we study sequences of TU games in which the values of coalitions at future times are not known beforehand, and are subject to changes over time (Alparslan Gök, Miquel, & Tijs, 2009; Lehrer, 2002) . Such games may arise in a number of real life situations, for instance, in joint replenishment applications (Bauso & Timmer, 2009) , or communication networks (Saad, Han, Debbah, Hjørungnes, & Başar, 2009 ). In these games, an allocation rule assigns a payoff to each player in each time period. This payoff is bounded by external restrictions for example, due to contractual agreements or budget limitations.
In the spirit of ''approachability theory'' (Blackwell, 1956; Lehrer, 2002) and ''regret-based'' minimization (Cesa-Bianchi, Lugosi, & Stoltz, 2006; Hart & Mas-Colell, 2003) we pose two main questions: (i) under which conditions do the allocations converge to a core-element of the game, and (ii) when do the allocations converge to some specific allocation, the so-called nominal allocation? The main contribution of this paper is a constructive way to design allocation rules for sequences of TU games that guarantee the convergence of the allocations to the core, or the ε-core, of the average game. Our design method ✩ The material in this paper was not presented at any conference. This paper was recommended for publication in revised form by Associate Editor George Yin under the direction of Editor Ian R. Petersen.
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also works if the game designer has delayed information on the coalitional values, that is, he or she does not know the current values of coalitions. Then the payoffs are based on the cumulative excesses of the coalitions, which depend on the former coalitional values. The allocation rule has to be robust to be able to deal with the uncertain values of the coalitions. Our approach is different from the one in Suijs, Borm, Timmer, Borm, and Tijs (1999) and Suijs, Borm, Timmer, Borm, and Tijs (2003) as there the values of coalitions are modelled by random variables, whose distributions are known to the players. Also, these games are static, whereas our model is dynamic since it considers values of coalitions that vary exogenously over time (cf. Filar and Petrosjan (2000) and Haurie (1975) ).
In this paper, we extend the dynamic system theoretic framework of Bauso and Timmer (2009) such that it can handle external bounds on the allocations, and we also deal with unbalanced games. Our results show necessary and sufficient conditions for allocation rules to belong to the cores of the games, or to converge to specific nominal allocations. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. In Sections 3 and 4 we present our results for respectively the balanced and unbalanced games. Section 5 illustrates our design method by a numerical example.
The model
In this section we introduce our model. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players. A coalition S is a nonempty subset of the player set 
An allocation in the core distributes the value v(N) over all the players in such a way that any coalition receives at least as much as it can obtain on its own. A related concept is the so-called ϵ-core (Lehrer, 2002) . The ϵ-core is the set of all allocations such that the total amount received by each coalition exceeds or is equal to the value of the coalition reduced by a given tolerance ϵ:
We say that a game is ϵ-balanced if and only if its ϵ-core is nonempty.
Let v(t) = [v(t, S) ] S⊆N be a vector of values of the coalitions at time t, and let V be a bounded polyhedron. The sequence
is a sequence of cooperative games, one for each time period. Letv be the vector of average coalitions' values,
Notice that the coalitions' values vary according to some exogenous random process. Let I be the (m − 1)-dimensional identity matrix. Define the matrix
Denote the column vector of non-negative surplus variables by
′ is the transpose of a given vector
Now, if ⟨N, v⟩ is a balanced game then finding an allocation a in the core C (v) is equivalent to finding an augmented allocation vector
Allocations to players are made at an integer rate 1/Θ, Θ < 1, whereas the rate of change of the coalitional values equals one by default. Hence, we obtain a new sequence,
Then the sequence of games (1)- (2) corresponds one to one with the sequence of games
In the remainder of this paper, we always refer to this latter sequence of so-called instantaneous games.
We assume that the augmented allocation vector u is bounded by the polyhedron
The instantaneous games with the above additional bounds on allocations provide a stylized model of any situation where the allocations are subject to budget limitations, or contracts or binding agreements between the game designer and the players.
Define x(k + 1) ∈ R m as the state variable of the system at stage k + 1, with x(1) the excess at time 1 (take x(1) = 0 for sake of simplicity). This vector of variables describes the cumulative excesses of the coalitions over the games v(1), . . . , v(k),
Here we write
Note that we can interpret u(k) as the control variable as it reflects the revenues that the game designer chooses to allocate to the players at stage k. If at stage k the game designer knows x(k) and v(k − 1), so the information on the game values is delayed by one period, then she will design allocation rules that depend on the state x(k).
Balanced games
We start by analysing allocation rules for balanced games. The lemma below provides necessary and sufficient conditions for sequences of games to be balanced in terms of the sets V Θ and U. 
Proof. From the definitions it follows that balancedness is equivalent to (8). Next, we prove (9).
(Sufficiency). If (8) is true, then there exists a vector
We consider situations where the game designer knows x(k) and v(k − 1) at time k; there is a one-period delay in the information of the game values. Given a function f (k), denote byf the long term average of a given function f (k), i.e.,f =
is not known at time k then the core C (v(k)) is also not known, and its elements cannot be used for allocations. In this case, allocations outside the core may be approximately close to the core of the average game according to a certain tolerance ϵ. Average games and ϵ-balancedness are related as follows. 
Proof (Sufficiency). Assume first thatk exists (we prove its existence below), and take for it the first time instant where
We can repeat the same argument inductively fork + 2 and so on. This proves that −x(k) ∈ V Θ for all k ≥k. Now, we prove the existence ofk. Consider any time instant k
Using the above equality, the dynamics for w(k) turn out to be
If u 2 is chosen such that Au 2 is in the opposite direction to w, then the formulation of w(k + 1) implies that the norm of w is reduced. By (10) and 0 ∈ V Θ we have 0 ∈ int{AU}, and so
for some β, until ∥w(k)∥ = 0 for a large enoughk. This in turn implies that −x(k), whose dynamics can be rewritten as −x(k) = −w(k) + v(k − 1), is ultimately bounded in V Θ .
Hence we have shown that there exists a timek such that −x(k) ∈ V Θ , and ∥x(k)∥ ≤ ϵ as well, for all k ≥k. Now, using Proof (Sufficiency). Assume D satisfies (13) and (15). Using a standard property of linear algebra, we can find matrices C ∈ R (n−1)×(n+m−1) and F ∈ R (n+m−1)×(n−1) such that
with I the (n + m − 1)-dimensional identity matrix. Using C and y(k) ∈ R n−1 we construct the augmented dynamic system
Also, we use matrix F to define a new variable z(k) ∈ R n+m−1 as expressed below:
Using (16) and (17), this variable evolves according to the following dynamic equation:
It is useful to write the above dynamics componentwise. Then
where D i is the ith row of D and u i,min
First, we show that there exists a timek such that −u i,max Using (20) in the dynamics (19) and again because of (15), we obtain z i (k
Further, the proof for z i (k) > −u i,min is along similar lines.
Next, take without loss of generality u nom = v nom = 0. Because of (15), note that the dynamics (19) and (20) 
This proves that fork large enough ∥z(k)∥ ≤ max τ ≥k ∥Dv(τ )∥ for all k ≥k. This condition also implies that
∥ = ϵ for all k ≥k, which proves condition (11).
To prove (15), we use (18) to obtain
This converges to 0 as T → ∞, since the numerator is a finite quantity whereas the denominator tends to infinity. Therefore,ū = Dv, and soā = a nom .
(Necessity). We show that if (13) and (15) do not hold then (11) does not hold as well. Actually, if (13) and (15) are not true then invoking results in Bauso, Blanchini, and Pesenti (2006) Section 3 there exists no allocation rule u(k) such that (9) and (15) hold. This implies that (8) and therefore (10) are not verified. Invoking Theorem 2, we also have that (11) does not hold. This concludes our proof.
Unbalanced games
In this section, we consider allocation rules for sequences of games that are, in general, not balanced. This is the case, for instance, when condition (8) in Lemma 1 does not hold.
Assumption 1.
The following condition is satisfied:
We also assume that the expected coalitions' values are not correlated with the state, and coincide at each time with the long term average. This is reasonable since the coalitions' values are independent of the past allocations and, differently from Filar and Petrosjan (2000) and Haurie (1975) , vary according to some exogenous random process.
Assumption 2. The vector of coalitions' values
We translate the origin of the u and v spaces without loss of generality.
Assumption 3. For ease of calculations set u nom = v nom = 0 and assume thatv = v nom = 0 ∈ int{AU}.
Define the distance between a point x ∈ R n and a set S in R n as d(x, S) = min y∈S ∥x − y∥, and define the function V (x) = x T x/2. Our main result on unbalanced games is stated below. 
Proof. The first part of the theorem, which establishes d(ā
→ 0 for k → ∞, is proved if we show that x(k) tends to zero with probability one. Let u(k) be defined as in (22), and recall that 0 ∈ int{AU}. For x ̸ = 0 the new variable w(k)
satisfies the condition
by definition of u(k), and because 0 ∈ U. Further, w(k
by definition of w(k) and (7). This implies x(k+1) = w(k+1)−v(k). Applying the triangle inequality results in
If we take expectations we obtain E(
This last inequality implies that x(k) tends to zero with probability one (and x(k) is said to be stochastically stable).
The proposed rule does imply stochastic stability but it does not necessarily satisfy (15). To enforce (15) we use (19) which we rewrite as z i (k 
2 /2, and slightly modify (22) to
) which means that the z i (k) subsystem is stable with probability one. Then,
→ 0 with probability one. This proves (15).
Numerical example
Consider three players and the following coalitions' values (c.f.
multi retailer system in Bauso and Timmer (2009) [4, 5, 3, 4, 5, 3, 7, 4, 4] T .
Note that Au nom = v nom . We translate the origin of the u-v space to u nom -v nom . First, we calculate D by using the linear program in Bauso et al. (2006, Section 5 .2). Then we compute matrices C and F that square B and D, as described in the proof of Theorem 3, using the method explained in detail in the appendix of Bauso and Timmer (2009) . For the maximum sample time we get Θ * > 0.1 and choose Θ = 0.1.
In a first set of simulations, we consider the bounding polyhedron U := {u ∈ R and as such the conditionû ∈ U holds. Now, we implement the dynamic allocation rule (20) to simulate the evolution of the system as displayed in Fig. 1 , left. In the simulation, coalition {1, 2} takes on values from the repeated deterministic sequence [−2, 3, −2, 3, −2, 3, −2, 3, −2, −2]. Likewise for coalition {1, 3} and sequence [−3, 2, −3, 2, −3, 2, −3, 2, 2, 2] and coalition {2, 3} and sequence [−4, 3, −4, 3, −4, 3, 3] . Note that after translation of the origin to v nom we must havev = 0 and therefore we need to consider sequences with zero mean. Fig. 1 top left, illustrates the time plot of x(.). The variable is ϵ-stabilized with ϵ < 0.4 in accordance with (11). Fig. 1 bottom k is the average of u(k) up to time k. All plots tend to zero which means that the averageū(k) tends to u nom .
